In a nutshell, explanations of support for European integration have developed from a focus on primarily 'hard' economic and utilitarian predictors to 'soft' predictors such as feelings of identity and attitudes towards immigrants. During the initial years of European collaboration, 'permissive consensus' was dominant and there was little interest in public opinion and in understanding public support for integration. Later, variation in public support was largely seen as a function of utilitarian and cost/benefit considerations (Gabel, 1998) . With the progress of integration and the decline of public support, there has been an increasing awareness of 'soft' predictors for understanding (a lack of) support. Feelings of identity (Hooghe and Marks, 2005; McLaren, 2002) and fear of immigration (De Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2005) have become parts of the explanations of public opinion.
On the topic of the potential membership of Turkey in the EU, both sets of considerations conceivably play a role. The issue has been framed by political elites and the media as both an economic issue (e.g. labour migration, subsidies going to Turkey) and an issue of European identity, safety and values Koenig et al., 2006) . We hypothesize that 'soft' considerations will be of greater importance for understanding variation in public support for Turkish membership. We also assume that the impacts of utilitarian considerations are indirect and mediated through immigrationrelated considerations. This has implications for future investigations of public support for the issue of Turkish membership in particular and European integration in general. The EU opened negotiations with Turkey in October 2005. These negotiations are ongoing and complicated. Public opinion is expected to be crucial for the negotiations because public acceptance of the negotiation outcome, either in the indirect form of parliamentary support or directly through public opinion or a referendum, is necessary.
EU support: From hard to soft predictors
The question of why some people embrace the notion of European integration whereas others oppose it has generated a considerable number of studies. Understanding variation has been explained in terms of cognitive mobilization (e.g. Inglehart, 1970) , utilitarian and economic considerations (e.g. Gabel and Palmer, 1995) and satisfaction with the incumbent government (e.g. Franklin et al., 1995; Ray, 2003) , as well as sociodemographic characteristics and political-ideological preferences (e.g. Gabel, 1998) . More recent explanations include feelings of national identity (Christin and Trechsel, 2002; Hooghe and Marks, 2005; Marks and Hooghe, 2003) , national pride and territorial identity (Carey, 2002) , perceived cultural threat (McLaren, 2002) and fear of immigration (De Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2005) . We briefly address each of these explanations and utilize most of these in our model for explaining support for Turkish membership in the EU.
Several studies have pointed to the relevance of 'hard', economic considerations for understanding support for the EU. Macroeconomics (such as inflation and unemployment) may matter (e.g. Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993) , but microeconomics, focusing on how some people benefit from European integration while others do not, have proven more important (Gabel, 1998) . In particular, the 'subjective utilitarian model' suggests that European integration is supported if perceptions and future evaluations of the economy are positive.
Extant research has also demonstrated that 'Euro-opinions' are to a considerable extent a product of citizens resorting to proxies when formulating their view on integration. These proxies typically stem from the national political arena (Anderson, 1998; Franklin et al., 1994) . In particular the importance of government approval of and support for incumbent political parties has been considered. When a pro-European government, for example, calls a referendum on an issue of European integration, supporters of that government are more likely to follow in favour of a pro-European proposition (Franklin et al., 1994; Franklin et al., 1995) . Inglehart (1970) proposed that citizens with higher levels of cognitive skills would be more at ease with a supranational entity. This was extended to suggest that those with a political value system favouring non-material values (such as self-fulfilment and concerns with democracy) above material values (such as financial security) would be more favourable towards European integration (Inglehart, 1977) . Later analyses found only limited support for this idea, either by reducing the argument to the original member states only (Anderson and Reichert, 1996) or by controlling for a number of the explanations outlined here (e.g. Gabel, 1998) .
In recent years there has been an increasing scholarly interest in antecedents of attitudes towards European integration stemming from non-economic, non-party political preferences. This interest in 'soft' explanations co-occurs with at least two important developments. First, the nature of the 'European project' has changed in the wake of the Maastricht Treaty, which set out a path of far-reaching economic and also political cooperation, much of which took effect in the late 1990s and early 2000s. At the same time, a growing number of citizens across Europe started to express reluctance about further integration, a change in public support later coined as Euroscepticism, which marked the end of the 'permissive consensus' during which most citizens seemed to (quietly) accept advances in integration decided by political elites.
Indeed, the change in the (perceived) nature of the integration project has made several considerations applicable when understanding variation in support for EU issues. Citizens' feelings of national attachment and their perceptions of threats to the nation-state and to the nation's interests and cultural integrity have been shown to matter (Kritzinger, 2003) . Marks and Hooghe (2003) differentiate between cultural and economic threats and, when controlling for economic evaluations, find these to have a significant impact on EU support. McLaren (2002) argues that reluctance about integration is a function of the perceived cultural threat and it has been shown how the perceived threat of immigration can fuel public anti-EU integration sentiments (De Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2005) .
In the case of potential Turkish membership of the EU, given the multifaceted nature of the issue, it can be expected that economic, utilitarian considerations apply as well as a number of questions concerning feelings of national identity and ways of thinking about foreigners. In a study on public attitudes towards Turkish membership, McLaren (2007) demonstrated how group interests outweigh economic self-interests when it comes to considering Turkish membership. This relationship is conditioned by context, more precisely by the threat of immigration, so that the group considerations weigh even more strongly in contexts with higher levels of immigration.
In this study, we corroborate previous work and suggest that the issue of Turkish membership shifts the emphasis of the ingredients of public opinion towards 'softer' identity-, threat-and immigration-related considerations. We extend this work by arguing that the impacts of 'harder' utilitarian considerations also partially operate through soft considerations. In technical terms, we expect a partial mediation effect (e.g. Baron and Kenny, 1986 ) by which economic considerations operate both independently to shape public opinion and through the relationship with anti-immigration sentiments. We base this expectation of a mediated relationship on the extensive literature on anti-immigration attitudes, which demonstrates how negative economic evaluations fuel such sentiments and behaviour (e.g. Citrin et al., 1997; Quillian, 1995; Sniderman et al., 2000; Sniderman et al., 2004) 
Hypotheses
Our first goal is to demonstrate that, on the issue of Turkish membership of the EU, which has implications in the realms of politics, economics and culture, we can expect many factors to matter for understanding the variation in public support. When reviewing established factors explaining support for the EU, a shift of emphasis from rather hard economic factors (e.g. Gabel, 1998) to softer identity-related factors (e.g. McLaren, 2002 McLaren, , 2007 is evident in the literature. Therefore, we explicitly expect the importance of 'soft' explanations to outweigh the importance of 'hard' explanations (Hypothesis 1). This expectation is augmented by the importance of feelings of identity and the relevance of immigration-related sentiments. Given that Turkey would become the largest member of the EU, individuals with non-inclusive feelings of identity are likely to oppose membership of an entity of this magnitude, and also because of religious considerations and perceived cultural incompatibility. Similarly, individuals who are reluctant about immigration are likely to oppose membership given the potential access of Turkish citizens to current EU member states.
Our second goal is to demonstrate that the effect of utilitarian considerations is partially mediated through anti-immigration sentiments (Hypothesis 2). We expect this to be the case on the basis of previous research and because (a) negative economic expectations are related to antiimmigration sentiments and (b) Turkey in the EU is seen as a vehicle for increased immigration.
Based on extant research, as outlined above, a positive relationship between support for Turkish membership and gender (male), age, education, income, knowledge and post-materialism should be provable. Individuals with a right-wing ideological preference should be less supportive of Turkish membership than individuals with a centrist ideological preference. We assume that support for Turkish EU membership is positively related to favourable evaluations of the incumbent government and positive evaluations of the economy. Economic evaluations and government support have been found to be interrelated (Wearing et al., 2000) . The power of these hard factors in support for further European integration is, as outlined above, well established in relation to both EU enlargements and various European policy areas. We finally test the impact of exclusive national identity and fear of immigration on support for Turkish membership and expect both to be negatively related to support. The last two predictors are considered 'soft' predictors. This makes sense in the light of the EU moving from being a more or less exclusively economic union to nowadays incorporating cultural and social policy.
The interest of this article is twofold. First, we seek to demonstrate the overriding importance of soft factors, replacing the explanatory value of hard factors, in EU support. Second, we argue that hard and socio-demographic factors have not become irrelevant in explanatory models, but that their influence on EU support is to a large degree mediated through the soft explanatory variables. We conclude that in modelling the factors influencing EU support we need to take into account soft factors and to realize that modelling is maybe less straightforward than it is usually presented.
Methods
To test our hypotheses while adequately controlling for other influences, we cannot rely on the most readily available data (the Eurobarometer) because a number of the key concepts are either not included in the barometer or poorly operationalized. EB 66 is the EB data set that comes closest to being appropriate since it contains questions about citizens' support for Turkey's enlargement of the EU and a number of other relevant measures. However, it does not include key variables tapping post-materialism or government support, and it includes only one inadequate question on immigration sentiments. We therefore collected new data to test the antecedents of public support for Turkish EU membership, the importance of 'soft' versus 'hard' predictors and their mediated influences. The trade-off is that we can focus on one country only. Our study was conducted in the Netherlands against the backdrop of an EU Council summit in December 2004. Here, leaders of the European Union met to discuss whether Turkey met the political criteria that were set out as preconditions for entry to the EU and to agree upon a date to start negotiation talks. 1 The survey was fielded four weeks before the summit. 2 A net sample of 1630 respondents participated, which produced a response rate, computed according to AAPOR definition Response Rate 1, of .74. The survey was webadministered and respondents were drawn from a representative database of approximately 55,000 members of the Dutch population. The database reflects the Dutch population, with computers and Internet access being provided to non-computer owners. Correspondence between our sample and population data from the Central Bureau of Statistics for a number of sociodemographic variables, such as age, gender and education, is satisfactory. Descriptive information regarding the sociodemographic composition of the sample is provided in Table 3 in the Appendix.
The dependent variable is attitude towards Turkish EU membership, measured by asking respondents 'How do you think about possible membership of Turkey in the European Union?' Answers were given on a five-point scale ranging from 'very negative' to 'very positive'. 3 The independent variables include gender (1 = female), age (in years), education (coded into six categories ranging from low to high) and household income (coded into four categories running from low to high). Further, we measured ideological preferences (dummies for left and right, with middle as reference category), support for post-materialist values (materialist low, post-materialist high) and political sophistication (a weighted additive index of political knowledge and political interest). We included questions tapping evaluations of the economy and the government (five-point scales, with high being positive) and whether respondents held an exclusive Dutch identity (dummy), and we used a sixitem measure for anti-immigration sentiment. Question wordings, means and standard deviations (SD) for all items, as well as scale reliabilities, are reported in Table A1 in the Appendix. The range of all variables was standardized and we report unstandardized coefficients.
Data analysis
Our first interest is to assess the relative contribution of 'hard' versus 'soft' predictors of support for Turkish EU enlargement. To test our hypothesis we employ a series of regression models successively adding new explanatory variables, thereby assessing the explanatory value of each of the models and the improvement of the model when introducing new variables. We report the percentage of variance explained for each model and test for the significance of increases in explained variance. The first model (A) accounts for sociodemographic predictors, and the second model (B) adds 'traditional' explanations such as ideology and political sophistication. The third model (C) then accounts for 'hard' explanations such as economic evaluations and an assessment of the incumbent government. For a comparison of the explained variance, the fourth model (D) includes, alongside sociodemographic and traditional explanations, only 'soft' explanations such as holding post-materialist values and an exclusive national identity and attitudes towards immigration. The final model (E) includes all established predictors and allows a comparison of the contribution of the different variables to the explained variance in support.
Our second assumption is that the effects of sociodemographic, traditional and hard predictors are, at least partly, mediated by the more recent soft factors. We assess this by using structural equation modelling. The model that is presented reflects the theoretical considerations outlined above and was computed using Amos 5.0. To assess the model fit, we report the comparative fit index (CFI), the parsimony-adjusted comparative fit index (PCFI) and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA). 4
Results
First, we look at the importance of more recent soft explanatory factors of EU support compared with the more established traditional and hard factors. We start with a very simple model incorporating only sociodemographic variables as explanatory factors for supporting Turkish accession to the EU (Table 1, Model A). As expected, education has a strongly significant positive influence on public support, with those who are more highly educated being more likely to support Turkish EU accession. Furthermore, also in line with our expectations, we find men to be more supportive than women. Age and income are not substantially related to support. The explanatory power of the model is very low, explaining only 1.4% of the variation in the dependent variable. In the second model (Table 1 , Model B), we add political sophistication and ideology. Whereas the former shows no relationship with the dependent variable, a right-wing ideological outlook in particular has a strong and negative influence on support for Turkish accession. Left ideology has only a marginal but positive impact on support. Including these measures somewhat reduces the impact of education, and income becomes a marginally significant predictor. The explanatory power of the model rises to almost 6%, which is significant but still not impressive. The traditional explanatory factors do not exercise strong influences and do not perform well in explaining support for Turkish EU membership.
In the next model (Table 1 , Model C) we add government assessments and evaluations of the economy as so-called 'hard' predictors to the model. It becomes evident that economic evaluations are by far the most important of the newly added variables in the model, with people having a positive evaluation of the economy being more likely to support Turkish EU accession. Government evaluations contribute somewhat strongly as an explanatory factor, with people thinking well of the government being more supportive. The most important predictor in the model, however, remains right-wing ideology. Including the hard variables further decreases the impact of education, and renders income insignificant again. The explanatory power of the model rises significantly to almost 10%.
In the next step (Table 1 , Model D) we test the impact of the soft factors, but leaving out the hard factors of government and economic evaluations. First, we note that the explanatory power of the model now significantly increases to 22%, thereby performing substantially better than the previous model(s). Anti-immigration attitudes far exceed the power of any other variable in the model. People who think negatively about immigrants and immigration are much more likely to oppose Turkish accession to the EU. However, holding an exclusive Dutch identity is also a strong negative predictor of support. Including these variables substantially decreases the impact of right-wing ideology, which, however, is still a significant negative factor. The last two steps in the model-building process tentatively suggest that the direct effects of variables such as education, income and ideology are at least partly mediated through evaluations of the economy and anti-immigration attitudes.
We now turn towards a test of the full model incorporating all independent variables (Table 1 , Model E). Clearly, anti-immigration attitudes, holding an exclusive national identity and economic evaluations turn out to be the strongest explanatory factors in the model. Right-wing ideology and to a lesser degree government evaluations and post-materialism are significant factors explaining support for Turkish EU accession. Interestingly though, adding economic and government evaluations to the previous model (Model D) raises the explanatory power of the model by only 2%, to approximately 24%. In contrast, adding the soft predictors to the hard model (Model C) caused a rise of 14% in explained variance. This is a strong indication that the soft factors are considerably stronger predictors of support. 5 One might suspect that this strong effect of anti-immigration sentiments is owing to the fact that we employ support for Turkish membership in the EU as dependent variable, which is a policy where identity and immigration concerns arguably play a stronger role. This concern is only partly relevant, though. When using a measure of general support for European integration as the dependent variable, we find the relationships shown here largely confirmed (see Table A2 in the Appendix). 6 Although economic and government evaluations play a stronger role in general EU support than for Turkish EU accession, we still find holding an exclusive national identity and antiimmigration attitudes to be the most important predictors of general support.
Do these results indicate that the more traditional factors and hard variables are rather irrelevant for explaining EU support today? Not necessarily, since, as we argue here, their influence might be to a large degree mediated through the soft variables. We test this proposition by means of structural equation modelling techniques. Based on the results of the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, the theoretical considerations outlined above and a pragmatic model modification indication, we estimated the model shown in Figure 1 (only hard and soft factors shown here). We find that, similar to the regression models, only five of the measures have a significant influence on support: economic evaluations, exclusive national identity, post-materialism, right-wing ideology and -again the strongest predictor -anti-immigration sentiments. There are, however, also substantial relations between the different explanatory variables employed in the model. Rather than having a direct effect on support, government evaluations affect evaluations of the economy, which in turn influence support. Economic considerations, however, are also strongly related to anti-immigration sentiments, so that part of the impact of the hard factors is indeed mediated through the soft factor of antiimmigration sentiment. Furthermore, identity is a strong predictor of anti-immigration sentiments, but at the same time is strongly related directly to support. Besides right-wing ideology, none of the traditional variables shows a direct effect on support in the full model. So did, for instance, education become irrelevant in explanations of EU support? The list of effects shown in Table 2 confirms that some of the hypothesized direct effects were refuted by the OLS analysis, because they are mediated through other variables. We focus here on those variables that do not have a direct effect on support, but that are shown to have an indirect effect, mediated through other variables. For instance, whereas left-wing ideology has no direct effect on support for Turkish EU accession, its effect is mediated through a range of other factors, in particular identity, immigration attitudes and post-materialism, which yield a considerable total effect of left identity. Similarly, traditional accounts explaining EU support emphasize the role of education and, when considering total effects, education is positively related to support. Its influence, however, is again mediated through, in particular, anti-immigration sentiments and national identity. Whereas rightwing ideology still has a direct effect on support, a substantial part of its total effect is also mediated through anti-immigration concerns. In sum, traditional factors do still matter, but to a substantial degree their impact is mediated by the soft variables.
Discussion
Public opinion on European integration has become salient for both the research and the political agendas in recent years. Following the No outcomes of two referendums on the EU Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands and a general increase in Euroscepticism across Europe (see , there is increased interest in understanding the antecedents of support for and scepticism about advanced integration. In the literature, multiple explanations of public support coexist. The relevance of different predictors has changed over time as the European integration project itself has changed. This observation is shared by recent analyses of European public opinion that have also stressed a variety of explanations rooted in feelings of identity, perceived cultural threat and fear of immigration (see Marks and Hooghe, 2003) . This study takes as its starting point the development from 'hard' predictors of support, such as utilitarian considerations and economic expectations (Gabel, 1998) , to 'soft' predictors in the realm of cultural and identity-based considerations. The article focuses on one of the most contentious issues in contemporary Europe, the possible membership of Turkey in the EU. This European Union Politics 9(4) 5 2 2 issue is particularly interesting because it touches on economic, political and cultural dimensions. We specified and tested different models for explaining variation in support. The first model, including structural sociodemographic variables and 'early contenders' for explaining support (including Inglehart's sophistication and post-materialism theses), confirmed our expectations based on previous research but explained only a negligible share of variance. The inclusion of ideology indicated a particular negative effect of right-wing ideology on support for Turkish membership. Including 'hard' predictors such as economic expectations improved our model, but it was the inclusion of 'soft' predictors such as feelings of identity and anti-immigration attitudes that contributed most to explaining variation. Moreover, our study demonstrated how the importance of economic considerations is partially mediated by considerations with reference to immigration. These findings point to the increased importance of soft predictors, and also demonstrate that, in relation to an issue that touches on economic, political, and social and cultural dimensions, the latter outweigh the first in terms of importance for understanding public opinion. These are important lessons to learn for the progress of European integration, where public support is a necessity for the legitimacy of the project. That said, we acknowledge the single-country limitation and the salience of immigration and integration issues in this country (see .
Our study also found a negative, stable and significant effect of political sophistication on support for Turkish membership. Political knowledge is an important but ambiguous part of the equation. Inglehart (1970) suggested that those with greater political skills were more likely to support European integration (see also Anderson, 1998) . However, our finding is at odds with the 'cognitive mobilization' hypothesis as put forward by Inglehart. We suggest that the straightforward relationship between political sophistication and EU support is no longer applicable (see also Karp et al., 2003) . Indeed political sophistication may foster a greater awareness of the qualities of the EU and, even though general knowledge about the EU is low, it might be the case that those with some knowledge are less satisfied with or supportive of European integration. In the case of support for European democracy, Karp et al. (2003) offer an explanation for why this might be the case: political sophisticates may know that the European Parliament is not analogous to their national parliament and they might be more aware of and concerned about questions of accountability and system responsiveness. On the issue of Turkey, it might be the case that, as knowledge grows, evaluations of the future plans of the EU are more strongly rooted in the past performance of the EU, which might not always be seen as a good performance.
We consider our study to be a modest but important addition not just to our understanding of public opinion on European integration. It also provides the baseline knowledge needed to understand what drives changes in public support. Here we are well advised to turn also to the role of the political elites and the media and their framing of the issue. As has been shown, media coverage can lead to shifts in public support . Given the importance of considerations such as identity and sentiments vis-à-vis foreigners, we need to take a broader view when analysing media content in order to understand change in public support. News coverage both of the economy and of immigration and integration issues can be part of the answer in addition to real world developments. Finally, we point to the necessity to include more and better indicators in surveys aimed at understanding public opinion about Europe. Our study comes with the advantage of including most relevant indicators but at the price of investigating the relationships in one country only. How do you think will the Dutch economy develop in the coming 12 months?
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1
The start of negotiations was a highly contested issue. The EU summit had to be prolonged to reach agreement, whereby it was decided to start negotiations on 3 October 2005. To counter concerns about a pre-set outcome of the negotiations (namely the rather 'automatic' accession of Turkey in the end), a clause was added stating that the outcome of the negotiations was open and would not necessarily lead to the accession of Turkey. 2
The specific fieldwork days were 14-18 November. 3
Our dependent variable was chosen after analysis of data collected among a separate sample (n = 45) in which a six-item index tapping support for Turkish membership was employed. The six items formed a reliable scale (alpha = .75) but, more importantly, the item used as a dependent variable in this study performed virtually identically (in terms of means and distribution) compared with the index. Given that all components of the index also correlated positively with the general item, we, for obvious reasons of space and financial constraints, utilized the general single item in this study. 4
Byrne (2001) (Hair et al., 1998) . PCLOSE indicates the probability that the RMSEA value is below .05. 5
What happens if we include only attitudinal variables in the model? This exploratory analysis shows that using economic evaluations, postmaterialism, anti-immigration attitudes and government evaluations yields an only marginally worse model than the complete one discussed previously, with an explained variance of 21%. In this model, government evaluations turn out to be a non-significant variable. Further, a model including only anti-immigration sentiments and economic evaluations still yields 21% explained variance. Again, the impact of anti-immigration attitudes is about three times as strong as the impact of economic evaluations, pointing towards the strong relevance of including this soft factor in explanatory models of EU support. 6
The correlation between general EU support and support for Turkish accession is r = .41, p < .01. If general EU support is entered as a control variable in the regression models explaining support for Turkey in the EU, the explanatory value of the models increases; however, the effects of the variables of interest remain stable.
